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I. INTRODUCTION
College football in the South is said to be tantamount to religion.1 Its
popularity in the region is unmatched by any professional sports teams, and
many southerners are born and raised into families of college fans dating back
generations.2 Today, college football is very much a part of Southern culture
and identity, with each team possessing its own unique traditions. In the
context of merchandise, these traditions make money. As a result, universities
will go to great lengths to protect them.
One can hardly think of the University of Alabama’s football team without
being reminded of its legendary coach Paul “Bear” Bryant. When one hears
“Bear” Bryant, the image of the coach pacing the sideline with his famous
houndstooth fedora comes to mind. Coach Bryant was not only a winning
football coach; he was also a fashion trend-setter at the University of Alabama.
Throughout the years of Coach Bryant’s coaching tenure and beyond, Alabama
fans began regularly wearing houndstooth pattern clothing to football games.3
Today, houndstooth is abundant at Alabama football games. It is probably
accurate to say that Southern football fans nowadays, especially fans of teams in
the NCAA’s Southeastern Conference (SEC), would identify houndstooth
patterns or designs as synonymous with the Alabama Crimson Tide. For
Alabama fans, houndstooth is considered the “third, and unofficial” team
color.4 The university has therefore taken advantage of the pattern’s local
popularity as it now sells an array of team merchandise and game day clothing
with the houndstooth design.5 With the growing popularity of a pattern
symbolizing the team and the university, there comes the need to protect it.
The university has responded to this necessity by attempting to restrict the use
of the pattern in other business’s logos, with mixed results.6 The most recent
instance of attempting to restrict a company’s use of the pattern ignited a legal
battle as heated as any contest the Bear ever coached on the football field.
The University of Alabama’s lawsuit against Houndstooth Mafia is
illustrative of a modern trend of universities initiating lawsuits against those
accused of infringing their trademarked material.7 Unlike the unrivaled passion
for college football and its colorful traditions, this trend is not exclusive to the
1 Andrew Hall, College Football: The Pride and Joy of the South, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles /1875948-college-football-the-pride-and-joy-of-the-south.
2 Id.
3 The History of Alabama and the Houndstooth Hat, CAPSTONE REPORT (Mar. 24, 2016), http://
capstonereport.com/2016/03/24/the-history-of-the-alabama-houndstooth-hat/30799/.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See John Jennings, University Trademark Licensing: Creating Value Through a “Win-Win”
Agreement, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/doc
uments/uni_trademark _licensing_fulltext.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
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South. Universities across the country are increasingly turning to intellectual
property (IP) law to protect their images while “generat[ing] income” from the
dissemination of their unmistakeable “brand[s].”8 These goals are oftentimes
achieved through licensing agreements with those wishing to sell merchandise
with the university’s logos or marks; however, when unlicensed entities use the
mark or create a mark which can be easily confused with the university’s mark,
they may become liable for infringing on the university’s trademark, absent a
fair use defense consistent with the presence of consumer confusion.9
Universities execute trademark licensing agreements by granting licenses to
certain producers or distributors to create merchandise with their marks.10
Licensing agreements may be exclusive or nonexclusive and will normally spell
out in detail to what extent the licensed agents are authorized to use the mark.11
Perhaps most importantly, it is through trademark licensing agreements that the
marks earn money for the universities—in the form of royalties.12 Standard
royalty fees are generally in the range of 8% of sales, but universities will take
advantage of their increasing fame to boost overall revenue from these
royalties.13 Today’s universities, therefore, have a great interest in protecting
their marks from infringers in order to maximize profits from their mark’s use.
The interest that universities have in protecting their marks from
infringement is demonstrated by the resources they devote to that protection.
Universities today commonly have entire departments dedicated to the licensing
and protection of their trademarks.14 It is also a general practice for universities
to hire independent licensing firms, which not only assist in the licensing
process but also may take a proactive role in fighting infringement or
counterfeits.15 These resources are especially important for major universities
with popular sports teams, which stand to lose significant revenue from
unlicensed products.16

Id.
Id. See also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121–22
(2004).
Since the burden of proving likelihood of confusion rests with the plaintiff, and
the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to show confusion unlikely,
it follows (contrary to the Court of Appeals’s view) that some possibility of
consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use, and so it is.
10 Jennings, supra note 7.
11 Ryan Gabay, Note, Sunbeam: A Ray of Hope for Trademark Licensees, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 245,
253 (2013).
12 Id. at 254.
13 See Jennings, supra note 7, for a discussion of how the University of Texas increased revenue
from royalties following its football NCAA National Championship in 2005.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See id. for a discussion of the prevalence of counterfeiting at major college sporting events
such as football and basketball championship games.
8
9
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The University of Alabama undoubtedly has national fame given its recent
streak of football national championships and certainly has an interest in
protecting its marks to drive revenue and preserve its brand. Crimson Tide fans
have responded to the increase in national fame and popularity by buying and
proudly showing off their Alabama merchandise—to include any team marks or
clothing in the locally popular houndstooth pattern.17 In addition to the fans,
the university itself has responded to this increase in fame—and therefore
revenue—by aggressively initiating legal action against unlicensed vendors using
or creating certain marks related to its sports teams.18 Included in these
“infringing” marks (as the university sees them) are marks incorporating the
houndstooth pattern—even though the University of Alabama does not own a
trademark over the pattern.19
One such lawsuit has begun a legal fight which has put the relationship
between the United States Patent and Trademark Office—specifically the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)—and the federal courts in
jeopardy. When the University of Alabama sued Houndstooth Mafia, it
initiated a legal battle between administrative agencies and federal courts.20 The
ensuing standoff has resulted in a federal court order21 which, on the surface,
appears to be in direct conflict with a 2015 holding from the United States
Supreme Court.22 Because the TTAB has explicitly stated that it is reserving the
right to appeal, this standoff is not over.23
This Note will examine the legal consequences of Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Houndstooth Mafia Enterprises, LLC, (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23,
2016). Part II of this Note will discuss the background of the relationship
between federal agencies and federal courts—specifically, the relationship
between the courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Part II
will also examine the precedent set by the Supreme Court in B&B Hardware, Inc.
v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). Part II will conclude with a
discussion of the facts behind Houndstooth Mafia and where the case stands
today.

17 See Jon Solomon, Who has a right to use houndstooth? University of Alabama fights, even without a
trademark, AL.COM, http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/11/university_of_alabama _fight
s_u.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2013).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Houndstooth Mafia Enter., LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21645 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2016).
21 See Paolo A. Strino & Patricia A. Clark, Alabama District Court Orders TTAB to Vacate
Precedential Decision, GIBBONS IP LAW ALERT (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.iplawalert.com/2016/04
/articles/trademark/alabama-district-court-orders-ttab-to-vacate-precedential-decision/.
22 See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
23 TTAB Relents: Board Agrees to Vacate Likelihood of Confusion Finding at District Court’s Direction,
PROSKAUER (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/ttab-relents-bo
ard-agrees-to-vacate-likelihood-of-confusion-finding-at-district-courts-direction/.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss1/2

4

Chandler: Standoff Between the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) and
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

6/28/2018 10:16 AM

5

Part III of this Note will analyze the legal repercussions of Houndstooth Mafia
and the effects that the case will have on the relationship between agencies and
the courts, especially on the relationship between the courts and the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board. Furthermore, Part III will argue that the court order
of Houndstooth Mafia represents a step in the wrong direction given the Supreme
Court’s holding in B&B Hardware. Part IV will conclude that the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board should appeal the federal court’s order on the grounds
that the agency’s decisions have preclusive effect on the courts given the
holding of B&B Hardware.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TRADEMARKS

“A trademark may be a word, logo, design, scent, sound, color, personal
name, container, building or any number of other signifiers.”24 The Lanham
Act of 1946 provides legal protection to marks by allowing their owners to file
for registration with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).25 Mark
owners may file for marks that they intend to use in commerce,26 but are not
legally required to do so: mark ownership “flows from prior use,” but
registration of a mark provides additional benefits to the owner.27 Trademark
registration also benefits consumers by preventing confusion as to the source of
the product in order to guarantee that the consumer knows what he or she is
purchasing.28
However, not every mark is eligible for protection by registration. Marks
must first and foremost be distinctive—that is, representative of and identifiable
with the mark owner’s products or services.29 Marks that are only descriptive of

24 1-2 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.01 (Matthew
Bender & Co., 2017).
25 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1946).
26 Id.
27 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 16:17–
16:19, 19:9 (4th ed. 2016).
“Trademark ownership is not acquired by federal or state registration.”
Ownership rights “flow [only] from prior use”, either actual or
constructive . . . Similarly, incorporation under a corporate name does not, in
the absence of use, confer the right to prevent others from using a similar name.
Neither does a state registered mark give rights superior to a prior user of the
mark. Federal registration does convey important rights, however, such as the
priority of constructive use, and a presumption of validity, which may ripen into
“incontestable” status.
28 See GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24, § 1.03.
29 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1946).
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the mark owner’s goods or services will be denied registration by the USPTO,
unless the mark acquires a secondary meaning.30
In making that determination, distinctiveness is scaled by various levels of
protection eligibility.31 Marks that are “merely descriptive” are generally
unprotectable, while some marks can lose protection by becoming “generic” by
overuse in common language (for example, “Xerox” or “Kleenex”).32 More
creative marks, so called “arbitrary” or “fanciful” marks, are the strongest and
therefore most eligible for legal protection.33
Even if a mark is distinct, it may still be denied by the USPTO on other
grounds. The Lanham Act prevents registration of marks that consist of
national insignia, marks representative of living people without their consent,
and marks which closely resemble marks already registered with the USPTO.34
A licensing agreement represents a preventative measure used to protect
trademarks from infringement. The Lanham Act grants remedies to those
whose marks have been infringed, so long as the mark’s owner has given notice
of the registration wherever the mark is displayed (generally seen as ®).35
Under the act, owners of marks may sue for infringement if the alleged
infringers have reproduced the mark or a mark so similar that would cause
confusion as to its source, and use or intend to use the reproduced mark in
commerce or sales—all without permission of the mark’s actual owner.36
Rightful owners of marks are entitled to injunctive relief against an infringer’s
continued reproduction of the mark, and in cases of intentional infringement,
monetary damages.37
Registration eligibility for protection of “non-word” marks is generally more
difficult to assess in accordance with the “distinctiveness spectrum.”38
Although non-word marks may not fit neatly into the spectrum, courts have
consistently given protection to such marks that have “acquired secondary
meaning.”39 The mark must be distinct when the infringement cause of action
is filed; however, marks that are not initially distinct may acquire distinctiveness
given their identity and use over time.40

Id.
GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1946). See also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (finding 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a)’s prohibition of disparaging marks unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
35 15 U.S.C. § 1111.
36 Id. § 1114.
37 Id.
38 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24.
39 Id. See also Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., 783 F.3d 527, 546–47 (5th Cir.
2015) (holding a visual mark ineligible for protection due to being “merely descriptive” and failure
to acquire secondary meaning).
40 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24.
30
31
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Trademark dilution is similar to infringement, but differs in that it does not
necessarily involve confusion as to the source of the mark.41 The mark may be
diluted by blurring, which is “association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark.”42 The key to winning a dilution by blurring claim is that the
plaintiff’s mark be “famous.”43
How is a mark’s fame measured? Courts have applied various lines of
reasoning to try to answer this question. First, it is necessary to look at the
statute: “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services
of the mark's owner.”44 The reference to the “general consuming public”
indicates that a mark must be famous enough to be a household name and
easily recognizable among the whole population, rather than among, for
example, college football fans.45 Therefore, a mark’s fame must be general, and
not solely within a niche market.46 Consequently, the University of Alabama
would likely not be successful in litigating dilution claims over its Crimson Tide
team marks.
B. CREATION OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Citizens’ rights to legally protect their intellectual property are rooted in our
Constitution.47 The United States Constitution assigns the legislature the power
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”48 The “exclusive Right” alludes to protection via patent,
copyright, or trademark and is intended to induce creativity and inventions
which may benefit society.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (1946).
43 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 40.
44 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
45 See Bd. of Regents v. KST Electric, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 678–79 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
(denying anti-dilution protection to marks only famous in a niche market, in this case, college
football).
46 See Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
A threshold question in a federal dilution claim is whether the mark at issue is
“famous.” Under the TDRA [Trademark Dilution Revision Act], a mark is
famous if it “is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United
States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). By using the “general consuming public” as the
benchmark, the TDRA eliminated the possibility of “niche fame,” which some
courts had recognized under the previous version of the statute.
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48 Id.
41
42
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From the time the Constitution was ratified and throughout the nineteenth
century, Congress delegated a varying scope of power over patent review and
approval to the executive branch, eventually leading to the creation of the
United States Patent Office in 1836.49 A few years after Congress passed the
Lanham Act, it created the modern United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and gave it authority to review patent applications and grant or deny
them according to its independent judgment.50
Although the USPTO became the official authority for granting or denying
patents, it has little power to act beyond that limited scope because the
legislature did not delegate any rulemaking power to the agency.51 This limited
scope likewise applies to the Office’s authority over trademarks, given the same
statutory language referencing both the patent and trademark sides of the
Office.52 Furthermore, without any requirement that “deference” be given to
its decisions by the federal courts, the agency has virtually no power to enforce
its decisions, and unsatisfied applicants will look to the courts to rectify any
problems as need be.53
C. THE USPTO’S LIMITED AUTHORITY AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND
THE DOMINANCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

Many arguments have been made in favor of expanding the USPTO’s
rulemaking authority so that it no longer functions as a “weak administrative
agency” with little to no influence over substantive issues of law.54 The USPTO
alone “lacks authority to issue presumptively binding rules on the substantive
legal questions”—that authority is allocated to the federal courts.55 The agency
merely possesses the power of granting or denying patent applications without

49 Samiyyah R. Ali, Note, The Great Balancing Act: The Effect of the America Invents Act on the
Division of Power Between the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit, 69 VAND. L. REV. 217,
222 (2016).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 32
n.8 (2011). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (“The Director shall make rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office under
this Act.”).
53 Ali, supra note 49, at 222–23.
54 Id. at 223. See also John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 1041 (2011).
55 Golden, supra note 54 (“No matter how incoherent or tortured relevant judicial precedent is,
the USPTO must try to distill it into a set of comprehensible guidelines for several thousand
patent examiners, each of whom must ultimately rule on the patentability of claims in a sample of
the hundreds of thousands of applications that the USPTO receives annually.”).
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being able to determine “legal questions such as patentability.”56 These legal
questions are for the Federal Circuit to hear on appeal.57
Because of the USPTO’s lack of substantive rulemaking authority, Congress
created the Federal Circuit as a court of subject matter expertise to hear cases
on appeal from the USPTO’s decisions.58 Specifically, the Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the decisions of “the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board of the United States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to a
patent application, derivation proceeding, reexamination, post-grant review, or
inter partes review . . . .”59 Congress intended for the authority over intellectual
property law, such as patentability, to be shared among the branches—the
USPTO of the executive branch and the Federal Circuit of the judicial branch.60
Although the USPTO “has an established record of developing nonbinding but
influential interpretive rules on matters of substance,”61 federal courts (and the
Federal Circuit in particular) are not required to grant deference to any of the
USPTO’s decisions based on its interpretations of the law.62 It is argued that
this lack of judicial deference given to the USPTO’s rulings has bolstered the
Federal Circuit’s power as the only viable authority when it comes to
patentability.63
Despite the Federal Circuit’s overarching dominance in the realm of
intellectual property law, the USPTO has begun a trend of fighting back against
the court’s continuing lack of deference instead of simply allowing it to rule
adversely to its decisions on appeal.64 Legal scholars have developed various
arguments backing the USPTO’s quest for more power and control in the
patent process. One such argument for allowing the USPTO greater authority
Id. at 1046.
Ali, supra note 49, at 224 (“The Federal Courts Improvement Act (‘FCIA’) provided the
desired uniformity: the creation of the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over three
sources of appeals: (1) federal district court cases ‘arising under’ the patent laws, (2) proceedings
within the PTO, and (3) International Trade Commission (‘ITC’) investigations over potentially
infringing imported products.”).
58 Id.
59 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (1982).
60 Ali, supra note 49, at 242.
61 Golden, supra note 54, at 1044.
62 Ali, supra note 49, at 229.
63 Id. at 229–30 (“Many scholars have suggested that the failure of Congress to give the PTO
substantive interpretative powers of the Patent Act has rendered it a weak administrative agency.
Others have blamed the Federal Circuit for creating for itself the role as the dominant, and maybe
sole, player in patent policy. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has contributed to the balance of power
in the patent system by continuously denying deference.”).
64 See id. at 230–32, for case examples of how the Federal Circuit continuously denies
deference to the USPTO’s holdings and treats its limited administrative authority to interpret
substantive legal questions despite the USPTO’s attempts to assert greater control and authority
in the field of patent law. See also Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150
(1999).
56
57
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to be able to interpret law concerning issues of patentability is that the federal
courts have traditionally performed poorly at this task.65 The USPTO possesses
and maintains subject matter expertise in the field of intellectual property law,
whereas the federal courts struggle with developing various “tests” to apply on
a case-by-case basis, often resulting in conflicting holdings or splits among the
federal courts of appeals.66 The federal courts’ lack of expertise suggests that
judges are ill-suited to declare holdings on specific issues of intellectual property
subject matter, and certainly lack the competence “of their administrative
agency counterparts.”67
With the USPTO lacking interpretive authority over substantive legal
questions, and consequently, federal courts holding that authority, the process
of obtaining judgment over issues of intellectual property subject matter
becomes quite “lengthy.”68 Because of the USPTO’s lack of real binding
authority to interpret the law, patent or trademark applicants unhappy with the
agency’s decisions may simply amend their applications while also appealing to
the federal courts—creating a time-consuming process during which countless
other patent or trademark applications “hang in the balance,” dependent on the
court’s judgment.69 This lengthy process has been targeted with criticism by
legal experts who see it as inefficient and perhaps detrimental.
Because of the alleged incompetence of the courts to perform the necessary
analysis to make judgments over cases concerning specific intellectual property
subject matter, judges have been accused of declaring judgments simply based
on their personal ideals in order to create policy.70 They do this by
“camouflaging” their policy-making judgments behind multiple layers of legal
analyses to make it seem like there is a reasonable approach to their
conclusions, whereas in reality, the judges lack the required subject matter
knowledge to make the necessary legal inquiries.71
While arguments and proposals for expanding the USPTO’s interpretive and
thus rule-making authority are currently trending, there exist a number of
counter-arguments. One such counter-argument is simple: that the USPTO,
while maintaining expertise over the specific intellectual property subject
matter, lacks the requisite experience “to handle substantive questions of
statutory interpretation more competently than the courts.”72 The examiners of
the agency may be experts in the field of patents and trademarks, and thus able

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Golden, supra note 54, at 1075.
Id. at 1074–75. See Ali, supra note 49, at 223.
Golden, supra note 54, at 1084.
Id. at 1086–87.
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1085–86.
Id. at 1097.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss1/2

10

Chandler: Standoff Between the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) and
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

6/28/2018 10:16 AM

11

to provide an extensive amount of legal advice from their unrivaled knowledge
in that field, but they are not judges.73
A second counter-argument is that, because the USPTO is an administrative
agency and not a court, it is “overly subject to capture or bias.”74 Unlike a
court, which is unbiased and beholden to rules of ethics, administrative agencies
are prone to external influences which can potentially shape any rule-making
authority they may possess.75 For example, the USPTO may be subject to
industry capture, which is “the co-opting of regulatory agencies by [industry]
groups.”76 Businesses with an interest in the USPTO’s decisions on patents or
trademarks can seek to assert influence over the agency.77 Furthermore, being
an administrative agency within the executive branch subjects the USPTO to
political capture by politicians in the various branches seeking to use the agency
as a tool to accomplish their own agendas.78 This political capture has been
demonstrated by excessive lobbying for executive or legislative oversight of the
agency for the benefit of the large and powerful patent-holding groups.79
Despite the potential for capture or bias, many important administrative
agencies exist that have substantial rule-making authority.80 Furthermore,
where the USPTO has made decisions that limit eligibility for patentable subject
matter, the federal courts have often acted to expand the spectrum of
patentability (commonly by rejecting the USPTO’s decisions on appeal) under
the oversight of “major business interests.”81 This history may actually provide
evidence for the opposing view: that the courts, not the agency, are more prone
to capture.82
Besides the argument for expanding the rule-making authority of the
USPTO, the other related argument is that courts should give significant
deference to the USPTO’s interpretations of law. Currently, the Federal Circuit
maintains that courts are required to give “Chevron deference” to “procedural
rules” created by the USPTO.83 This type of deference refers to a Supreme

Id. at 1098.
Id.
75 See id. See also Ali, supra note 49, at 242–43 (defining of “capture”).
76 Ali, supra note 49, at 243 (quoting Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH.
L. REV. 205, 241 (2015)) (alteration in original).
77 Ali, supra note 49, at 243.
78 Id.
79 Golden, supra note 54, at 1098.
80 See id. at 1099–1100 for a list of administrative agencies with broad rule-making power,
despite the objection of the potential for capture. See also Ali, supra note 49, at 244, for a further
list of agencies having influence over the patent system.
81 Golden, supra note 54, at 1101–02.
82 Id. at 1102.
83 Id. at 1046–47 (“Further, Congress has explicitly granted the USPTO the power to make
rules ‘govern[ing] the conduct of proceedings in the Office.’ The Federal Circuit has ruled that,
with respect to rules promulgated under that authority, the USPTO receives Chevron deference, a
73
74
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Court case from 1984 involving a different agency: the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).84 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the EPA’s statutory interpretation (of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977) was “entitled to deference,” as long as
the agency’s interpretation was based on a “permissible construction” in line
with the intent of the law.85 The Court’s reasoning for requiring deference to
agency holdings addresses some of the aforementioned concerns over judicial
supremacy over agency decision-making:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases,
reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
judgments.86
Although Chevron represents an opportunistic power grab by the USPTO for
the enforcement of its holdings, this type of deference has been limited by the
courts.87 The USPTO only receives judicial deference on questions of law
concerning practices and procedures internal to the agency.88 Significantly, the
USPTO does not receive deference from the federal courts for “its legal
interpretations of the Patent Act.”89 Ultimately, the only judicial deference
afforded to the USPTO concerns its own procedural rules, but none for its legal
interpretations of substantive law.
D. THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (TTAB)

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) is an administrative body
within the USPTO which focuses exclusively on trademarks. Once the USPTO
determines the eligibility for a mark to be registered in the Official Gazette, any
unsatisfied parties may petition the USPTO for administrative hearings before
the TTAB.90 The TTAB only has jurisdiction to rule on “the right to register” a
high level of formal deference requiring courts to accept reasonable agency interpretations of
statutory law.” (alteration in original)).
84 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
85 Id. at 865–66.
86 Id. at 865.
87 Ali, supra note 49, at 229.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Lian Osier, Issue Preclusion: The Effect B&B Hardware Will Have on Trademark Litigation, 15 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 257, 259 (2016).
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mark—it has absolutely no authority to make holdings on infringement cases,
cases concerning rights to use certain marks, and cases involving unfair
competition.91 Because it is an administrative agency and not a court, the
TTAB may not make any holdings on the constitutionality of statutes or any
provisions of statutes (to include the Lanham Act).92 Having jurisdiction over
rights to register marks, the TTAB hears proceedings between adverse parties
(inter partes).93 The TTAB may hear four types of inter partes proceedings: (1)
opposition proceeding, (2) cancellation proceeding, (3) interference, and (4)
concurrent use proceeding.94
In an opposition proceeding, the plaintiff petitions the board to oppose the
issuing of a mark on the Principal Register, likely because he believes the mark
will cause him to suffer damages.95 In a cancellation proceeding, the plaintiff
petitions to have an already registered mark cancelled, for similar reasons.96 An
interference is a proceeding in which the TTAB must determine the rightful
owner of a mark and therefore award him the registration of the mark against
others with conflicting applications.97 Finally, a concurrent use proceeding is
one in which the TTAB must determine “whether one or more applicants is
entitled to a concurrent registration on the Principal Register.”98 The TTAB
will limit any concurrent registrations with certain geographic or time
constraints or further constraints as to the mark’s use in commerce.99
The TTAB may also hear “appeals of final refusals issued by USPTO
Trademark Examining Attorneys within the course of the prosecution of
trademark applications.”100 The TTAB’s operations are governed by the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP), which
contains the board’s standard operating procedures but holds no binding legal
authority.101
After the TTAB has issued its judgment, parties wishing to appeal have two
choices: appeal to the Federal Circuit or to a district court.102 When appealing
to the Federal Circuit, the parties are not permitted to introduce any new
evidence, unlike when appealing to a district court, in which new evidence as

GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24, § 102.01.
Id.
93 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, UNITEDSTATESPATENTANDTRADEMARKOFFICE.GOV,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/trademark-trial-and-appeal-board-ttab
(last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
94 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 24, § 102.02.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, supra note 93.
101 Id.
102 Osier, supra note 90, at 260.
91
92
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well as certain new claims (for example, dilution or infringement) are
permitted.103 Furthermore, “district courts have the authority to determine
whether registration should be granted or whether registration should be
cancelled.”104
Falling under the USPTO, the TTAB is likewise an administrative agency
under the same constraints: limited rule-making power, limited statutory
interpretive authority, and limited judicial deference.105 However, as recently as
2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a judgment directly related
to these constraints of authoritative power on the TTAB.106 The Supreme
Court in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015),
changed the legal landscape of not only practices and procedures in intellectual
property law, but also for the overall relationship between administrative
agencies and the federal courts.107
E. PRECLUSIVE EFFECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: WHAT B&B
HARDWARE MEANS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TTAB AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS

The Supreme Court heard B&B Hardware after decades of practice by the
Federal Circuit (and the federal courts in general) of denying any deference to
USPTO decisions concerning substantive legal issues.108 Before B&B Hardware
was decided, federal courts generally denied any deference to TTAB decisions
concerning trademark infringement because TTAB jurisdiction is primarily over
the right to register marks.109 The circuits, however, were split on the question
of what preclusive effect the TTAB holdings over such legal issues would
have—with the Third and Seventh Circuits giving TTAB decisions preclusive
effect, the Second Circuit in certain cases, and the Fifth, Eleventh, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits flat out denying preclusion to TTAB decisions.110 B&B Hardware
addressed this question and ruled that TTAB decisions over substantive issues,
such as likelihood of confusion, would require preclusive effect from federal
courts.111
B&B Hardware began as an opposition proceeding before the TTAB.112
B&B Hardware petitioned the TTAB to deny registration of Hargis’s mark
“SEALTITE,” claiming that it would be likely confused with its own mark,

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id.
Id.
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, supra note 93.
See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
See generally id.
See Ali, supra note 49, at 225.
Osier, supra note 90, at 262.
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263–64.
B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293, at 1297.
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“SEALTIGHT.”113 Both companies competed in similar markets: B&B
Hardware produced its SEALTIGHT “for fasteners in the aerospace industry”
and Hargis made its SEALTITE “for self-drilling screws for the construction
industry.”114 The TTAB ruled in B&B Hardware’s favor, denying registration
for Hargis’s “SEALTITE” on grounds of likelihood of confusion with B&B
Hardware’s “SEALTIGHT.”115
In addition to the opposition proceeding before the TTAB, both parties
engaged in trademark infringement litigation before a federal district court,
based on Hargis’s use of the mark.116 Likelihood of confusion is an element of
both registration eligibility and trademark infringement, and during the
opposition to registration proceedings before the TTAB, the agency held that
there was a likelihood of confusion and thus Hargis’s mark was not eligible for
registration.117 At the infringement litigation in federal court, B&B Hardware
argued that the issue of likelihood of confusion was moot because the TTAB
had already ruled that the likelihood existed, and therefore the court must give
preclusive effect to that decision and not rule on it again.118 The federal district
court declined to give deference to the TTAB’s decision on the likelihood of
confusion because the TTAB is an administrative agency, not a court, and
therefore its decisions are not entitled to issue preclusion.119 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit likewise denied deference, but on the grounds that the TTAB
used a different set of factors in its evaluation of the likelihood of confusion
issue than the district court had.120 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
reconcile the circuit split and decide whether and to what extent federal courts
must give issue preclusion to decisions of administrative agencies.121
According to the Restatement Second of Judgments, “[w]hen an issue of
fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.”122 The question before the Court was whether issue preclusion must
apply to administrative agency decisions on issues at argument in a federal
court. As previously mentioned, the federal circuit courts were split over this

Id.
Ralph H. Cathcart, B&B Hardware v. Hargis – What it Means and How it Will Affect TTAB
Litigation, LADAS & PERRY EDUCATION CENTER 1 (Aug. 24, 2015), http://ladas.com/educationcenter/bb-hardware-v-hargis-what-it-means-and-how-it-will-affect-ttab-litigation/.
115 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1297.
116 Id. at 1299.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1302.
120 Id. at 1297.
121 Id. at 1302.
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
113
114
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question.123 The Fifth Circuit, for example, took the approach that issue
preclusion did not apply to TTAB decisions because the TTAB analyzes issues
solely with respect to registration of marks, and not infringement—and
therefore are different issues altogether.124 The Second Circuit, like the Eighth,
zeroed in on the TTAB’s analysis of the issues before it—specifically, on the
factors it uses in making its decisions.125 According to the Second Circuit, the
TTAB uses a different analysis and applies a different set of factors when
reaching its decisions than those the courts use, then its decisions are not
binding on the courts.126 By granting certiorari to hear B&B Hardware, the
Supreme Court sought to eliminate this split among the federal circuits and rule
definitively on what judgments decided by administrative agencies are deserving
of judicial deference.
B&B Hardware’s argument was simple: that Hargis was “precluded from
contesting [the issue of] the likelihood of confusion” of the marks because the
TTAB had already ruled that the likelihood exists.127 The foundation of
Hargis’s argument was that decisions from administrative agencies are not
entitled to judicial deference, and in this case issue preclusion, because they are
not Article III courts and thus their decisions are not binding on federal
courts.128 Hargis pointed to a number of different lines of reasoning to support
its stance.129
Hargis first presented a constitutional argument: that in order for the
Lanham Act to be interpreted in harmony with the United States Constitution,
it must not allow Article III courts to award issue preclusion to decisions of
administrative agencies.130 In rejecting Hargis’s constitutional concerns, the
Supreme Court pointed to the precedent of giving preclusive effect to the
TTAB’s decisions, explaining that “our precedent holds that the Seventh
Amendment does not strip competent tribunals of the power to issue
judgments with preclusive effect.”131 Hargis furthered its constitutional
argument: that if federal courts allow issue preclusion to decisions of
administrative agencies, they violate Article III.132 Again, the Court referenced
See Osier, supra note 90, at 262–63.
Id. at 267. See, e.g., Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 9 (1974)
(“A claim for service mark and trade name infringement and a claim for registration present
different questions of law and fact, and the relief sought in one action is fundamentally different
from the relief sought in the other. . . . While the same parties are fighting over the same word in
the two suits, in substance, the causes of action are not the same.” (citations omitted)).
125 Osier, supra note 90, at 272.
126 Id.
127 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1297 (2015).
128 See id. at 1304.
129 See id. at 1304–09.
130 Id. at 1304. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States . . . .”).
131 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1304.
132 Id.
123
124
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precedent in denying Hargis’s constitutional concerns and refused to give the
Lanham Act such a narrow reading as would bring up questions of
constitutionality.133
Hargis next pointed to legislative intent, arguing that “Congress would not
want TTAB decisions to receive preclusive effect, even in those cases in which
the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met.”134 Although Justice Alito
did not go into great detail for the reasons behind Hargis’ legislative intent
argument, he bluntly stated that “nothing in the Lanham Act bars the
application of issue preclusion.”135 To support its argument, Hargis cited
Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991), which held
that the petitioner was not precluded from re-litigating a matter under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) in the federal courts.136
The Court distinguished Astoria by explaining that the petitioner there sought to
relitigate the same matter in federal court, unlike in B&B Hardware where the
registration claim was not reviewed by the TTAB and the infringement claim
was reviewed in the federal district court distinctly.137 The Court reiterated the
fact that the claim in the federal court was a separate claim than that before the
TTAB, and, notably, that “registration is not a prerequisite to an infringement
action.”138 To conclude its reasoning in rejecting Hargis’s argument of
legislative intent to deny preclusion to TTAB decisions, the Court held: “[w]hen
a district court, as part of its judgment, decides an issue that overlaps with part
of the TTAB’s analysis, the TTAB gives preclusive effect to the court’s
judgment.”139
Hargis’s last argument was its weakest. Hargis’s “streamlined process”
argument maintained the position that, by giving preclusive effect to TTAB
decisions for infringement litigation, the Court will essentially be holding up the
efficiency of the TTAB’s registration process.140 This holding would incentivize
parties in TTAB proceedings to devote “more time and energy” because of the
lasting effects that its holdings would have in subsequent litigation—thereby
destroying the “streamlined process” that Congress intended.141 The Court
firmly rejected this argument, saying if Congress intended trademark registration
to be a “streamlined process,” “it would not have authorized de novo challenges
for those ‘dissatisfied’ with TTAB decisions.”142

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 1304–05.
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1305.
Id.
Id. at 1305–06.
Id. at 1306.
Id.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)).
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In its judgment for Hargis, the Supreme Court rejected the analysis
employed by the Eighth Circuit—which focused on the factors used to
determine if the likelihood of confusion element was met—and held that
different factors examined by the TTAB and the federal courts “[do] not
prevent issue preclusion.”143 The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning for its factor test
was that, because different factors were employed to examine the issue of
likelihood of confusion, it was not the same issue at all—and therefore issue
preclusion would not apply.144 In its rejection of the factors test, the Supreme
Court stated “it does not matter that registration and infringement are governed
by different statutory provisions. Often a single standard is placed in different
statutes; that does not foreclose issue preclusion.”145 The court held,
importantly, “likelihood of confusion for purposes of registration is the same
standard as likelihood of confusion for purposes of infringement.”146
Therefore, despite different factors and different purposes for legal action
(registration and infringement), the issue was the same and the TTAB’s holding
on the issue of likelihood of confusion would preclude further examination of
the matter. The rule of B&B Hardware is "[i]f a mark owner uses its mark in
ways that are materially the same as the usages included in its registration
application, then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood-of-confusion issue
as a district court.”147
The immediate effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in B&B Hardware was
to reconcile the split among the federal circuit courts in regards to preclusive
effect on TTAB decisions.148 Furthermore, the decision enhanced the power
and authority of the TTAB by making its own determinations on issues of
trademark eligibility final and binding.149 Consequently, perhaps as foreseen by
Hargis, the “stakes” became “much higher” in a TTAB action because the
parties are now without the option to re-litigate certain issues in federal court
once they have been determined by the board.150
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case will certainly affect the
relationship between administrative agencies and federal courts, with the courts
now required to give deference to agencies’ holdings on issues being

143 Osier, supra note 90, at 265. See id. at 270–72 for a discussion of the Second Circuit’s
analysis of Levy v. Kosher Overseers Assoc. of America, 104 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit
employed the same “factors” analysis as the Eighth Circuit. The immediate impact from B&B
Hardware would not only reject the Eighth Circuit’s factor test, but also the Second’s.
144 B&B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1306.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1307.
147 Id. at 1308.
148 See Osier, supra note 90, at 262–63 (discussing the circuit split at the time the B&B Hardware
case was decided).
149 See Cathcart, supra note 114 (explaining greater importance of TTAB decision).
150 Id.
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concurrently or subsequently litigated. B&B Hardware was decided in 2015,151
so the long-term effects of the Supreme Court’s holding have yet to be seen.
However, in a recent case brought against a group of college football fans in
Alabama, a federal district judge seems to have completely disregarded the B&B
Hardware holding and instead sought to assert the federal court’s authority over
the TTAB152—representing a step in the opposite direction from B&B
Hardware.
F. HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA: B&B HARDWARE’S FIRST TEST

The University of Alabama, like other major universities with successful and
popular sports teams, has a major financial interest in protecting its marks.153 It
does so by registering the marks with the USPTO and issuing licenses to
vendors allowing them to sell merchandise featuring the marks in exchange for
royalties.154 Following the recent trend in increasing trademark infringement
litigation by universities, Alabama too has become increasingly aggressive in
Among the
opposing potentially infringing marks in recent years.155
University’s most recognizable marks is the houndstooth pattern, made famous
by its iconic coach, Paul “Bear” Bryant.156
Because of the pattern’s popularity among the fan base, the University has
sought to oppose any registration of marks using the pattern on grounds that
marks would be confused with the University of Alabama.157 As stated by the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, “[t]he University
has licensed the Houndstooth pattern as a trademark in connection with various
goods because it contends the pattern is well-known to be associated with the
University.”158
As noted by the federal court, the University of Alabama is a “repeat
player[ ] before the TTAB.”159 In the past decade, the University has opposed
the registration of the marks of GameDawg, LLC and The Tuscs, LLC because
of their use of the houndstooth pattern, claiming that the pattern “has long
been associated with the University and its former football coach, Paul
B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d
1150, 1157–58 (2016).
153 See generally Jennings, supra note 7.
154 See id.
155 See Solomon, supra note 17.
156 See The History of Alabama and the Houndstooth Hat, supra note 3, for a discussion of how Bear
Bryant made the houndstooth pattern synonymous with the University of Alabama and how its
popularity among Alabama fans has resulted in their adoption of the pattern as the “third, and
unofficial” team color.
157 See Solomon, supra note 17.
158 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d 110,
1154 (2016).
159 Id.
151
152
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Bryant.”160 The most recent case of houndstooth use comes in the wake of
B&B Hardware, and has initiated yet another standoff between the TTAB and
the federal courts.
Houndstooth Mafia began as a group of Alabama fans who tailgated
together at Crimson Tide football games.161 This group of friends called
themselves the “Houndstooth Mafia,” and decided to form a limited liability
corporation (LLC) to develop merchandise featuring the houndstooth
pattern.162 The group sought to register their mark with the USPTO in 2007,
only to have the University of Alabama (along with Paul Bryant, Jr., son of the
legendary coach) oppose the registration before the TTAB.163 The University
opposed the registration on the grounds that the houndstooth patterned design
would cause confusion as to the source of the mark and could cause people to
unknowingly associate the University or the coach with the “mafia”—organized
crime.164
The TTAB found in favor of Houndstooth Mafia, and held “that the
opposition lacked a showing of distinctiveness in the pattern, likelihood of
confusion with the University’s marks, or that the Houndstooth Mafia’s use of
the word ‘mafia’ is disparaging.”165 Following the TTAB’s holding for the
defendants, the University exercised its right to “challeng[e] the board’s ruling”
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) and filed suit in the federal district court for
the Northern District of Alabama.166 The University brought suit alleging
trademark infringement and unfair competition.167 During the course of this
subsequent litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement.168
Under the settlement agreement, Houndstooth Mafia would basically hand
over the mark’s rights to the University, but the University would agree to the
settlement if, and only if, the TTAB’s decision was vacated.169 Both parties
agreed to the terms, and Judge R. David Proctor of the Northern District of
Alabama signed the consent judgment, ordering the TTAB to vacate its holding
Solomon, supra note 17.
Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Will Gibbons, The University of Alabama Throws a Penalty Flag on the Use of Houndstooth Logo,
FINDING IP VALUE (Apr. 29, 2016), https://findingipvalue.com/2016/04/29/the-university-ofalabama-throws-a-penalty-flag-on-the-use-of-houndstooth-logo/.
166 Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1154. The University decided to file a
civil action in federal district court as opposed to appealing to the Federal Circuit in accordance
with 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1).
167 Gibbons, supra note 165.
168 Id.
169 Houndstooth Mafia Enter., 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1154. The University wanted the TTAB’s
decision regarding the lack of likelihood of confusion in this case vacated because, as the court
acknowledged, they are “repeat players before the TTAB” and were therefore “concerned with
the precedential effect of the TTAB’s 2013 decision.”
160
161
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of no likelihood of confusion concerning the houndstooth pattern mark.170
The TTAB, however, did not vacate its holding—and in June 2015 (three
months after the decision in B&B Hardware), decided on its own that it would
not go along with the consent judgment, prompting the University to seek
enforcement of the court’s order.171 The TTAB’s refusal thus reignited the
conflict between it and the federal courts, which seemed to have been at least
temporarily resolved by B&B Hardware. Perhaps bolstered by the decision in
that case to give its holdings preclusive effect (which in turn gives significantly
more weight to its decisions), the USPTO refused to simply fold like a cheap
suit and instead challenged the court on the grounds that “the parties did not
have the right to agree among themselves that the Board’s precedential decision
should be vacated.”172 This challenge by the USPTO, on behalf of the TTAB,
represents the first of such by an administrative agency against a federal court in
the post-B&B Hardware legal landscape.
III. ANALYSIS
A. WHAT HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA MEANS FOR THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS AND FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POST-B&B
HARDWARE ERA

The immediate outcome of Judge Proctor’s holding in the trademark
infringement action in the federal court of the Northern District of Alabama
was that the parties settled, and the University retained the rights to the
houndstooth pattern used in Houndstooth Mafia’s mark.173 The USPTO, on
behalf of the TTAB, however, fought the court’s order to vacate the TTAB’s
holding on the likelihood of confusion element in the previous action before
the court.174
In opposing the University’s motion to enforce the consent judgment, and
thus force the TTAB to vacate its judgment, the USPTO asserted that a federal
court is without authority to order vacatur of a decision by the TTAB in order
to satisfy a settlement between parties.175 The Office relied on U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994), to answer the question
of “whether appellate courts in the federal system should vacate civil judgments
of subordinate courts in cases that are settled after [an] appeal is filed or
certiorari sought.”176 In that case, after the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari, the adverse parties reached a settlement, and the petitioner
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

TTAB Relents, supra note 23.
Houndstooth Mafia Enters., 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1155.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1156.
Id. (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)).
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 19 (1994).
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subsequently asked the Court to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals
on the grounds that the settlement “mooted the case.”177 The Court
unanimously held that “mootness by reason of settlement d[id] not justify
vacatur of a judgment under review.”178 Justice Scalia cited several policy
reasons for denying vacatur based on a settlement agreement in this case: first,
it is “inappropriate . . . to vacate mooted cases, in which [the Court] ha[s] no
constitutional power to decide the merits, on the basis of assumptions about the
merits”; second, although vacatur of moot decisions may increase splits among
the federal circuits and prolong “debate,” circuit splits are important because
they highlight the issues to be analyzed by the Supreme Court; and third, the
“availability of vacatur” may “deter settlement[s] at earl[y] stage[s].”179
The federal court, however, cited 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1), standing firmly on
the grounds that it was acting as an appellate court in review of the TTAB’s
decision, and therefore, any order by the court must be followed by the
board.180 The court pointed out that the USPTO did not intervene “timely,” it
did not take an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit (the “controlling court”), and
U.S. Bancorp had no binding authority over this case.181 Judge Proctor also cited
precedent to back up his stance that the federal court has the final say in
conflict between it and administrative agencies.182
Under what circumstances may an administrative agency like the TTAB
refuse to comply with orders issued by federal courts? According to the federal
court in this case, the TTAB must comply because the district court is acting
with “appellate jurisdiction” and thus its orders are “mandates” upon the
agency.183 This argument would make sense if the district court was reviewing
the TTAB’s decision as erroneous. But no argument was made or presented on
the theory that the TTAB got it wrong concerning the likelihood of confusion
element of infringement—in fact, the district court never “received any
evidence suggesting that the board's decision was wrong.”184
Id. at 20.
Id. at 29.
179 Id. at 27–28.
180 Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1156–57 (“The [district] court [reviewing an inter
partes TTAB decision] may adjudge [1] that an applicant is entitled to a registration upon the
application involved, [2] that a registration involved should be canceled, or [3] such other matter as
the issues in the proceeding require, as the facts in the case may appear.” (emphasis added) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1)).
181 Id. at 1156.
182 Id. at 1157 (“Administrative agencies [ ] are not free to ignore [a] court’s mandates.” (quoting
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 200 F.3d 942, 950 (6th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in
original); “When a lower court is subject to appellate review, it ‘is not free to deviate from the
appellate court’s mandate.’ ” (quoting Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 1437, 1440 n.2
(11th Cir. 1984)).
183 Id. at 1156–57.
184 Charles L. Gholz & Katherine D. Cappaert, The Solicitor’s Office Should Monitor District Court
Reviews of Decisions by the PTAB and the TTAB Intervene When Appropriate, 92 PAT. TRADEMARK &
177
178
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Thus, the court’s order for the TTAB to vacate its holding came only to
satisfy the terms of a consent agreement between the adverse parties—which
the TTAB rightfully argues does not bind them to vacate a decision on the
merits.185 With a standoff between the federal courts and the TTAB now
erupting, the Director of the USPTO, Michelle Lee, decided to intervene.186
Fifteen U.S.C. § 1071(b)(2) allows the Director of the USPTO to intervene
in actions of concern within its jurisdiction, although it is rare for her to do
so.187 The standoff in Houndstooth Mafia presented an occasion important
enough to justify intervention by the Director. The Director should intervene
“when what the district court either has done or has been asked to do impacts
the institutional interests of the PTO.”188 Given the potential precedential
effect of the TTAB’s vacatur of a non-erroneous judgment by order of a federal
district court by means of enforcing a consent judgment, the USPTO certainly
had an institutional interest in the outcome of this case. Unfortunately for the
TTAB, however, the Director’s motion to intervene was too little, too late.
After “sitting on” this decision for a year, the court ruled that the motion to
intervene was untimely—and was thus dismissed.189
After the federal district court’s final opinion on the matter, the TTAB
reluctantly vacated its judgment—but signaled that the USPTO is retaining the
right to possibly seek further review of the matter.190 Therefore, while the case
between the University of Alabama and the Houndstooth Mafia may be over,
the legal issue resulting from it remains unsolved.
B. HOUNDSTOOTH MAFIA REPRESENTS A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION IN
THE POST-B&B HARDWARE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND THEREFORE THE
TTAB SHOULD APPEAL

It is important to keep the timeline of the Houndstooth Mafia case in mind.
The Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in B&B Hardware in March of
2015.191 The case stands for the rule of binding and final decisions of the
TTAB on issues of trademark eligibility (such as likelihood of confusion), and
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) (No. 2265, June 10, 2016), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/result
s/66eb7a8bcc2f8fbda2290ca161ae022e/document/X7UUI4PC000000?search32=LhkpchdFt_o
NAbox88RHw==6FCEMed0ttmkL2w0JayEut50dzsEcZ-9RfkUTqvJJt8cZ1fVItklsuECPvybiCg
0.
185 See Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (“[T]he parties did not have the right to agree
among themselves that the Board’s precedential decision should be vacated.”).
186 Id. at 1163.
187 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(2).
188 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184.
189 Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1165.
190 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184 (“The Director of the USPTO specifically reserves the
right to seek further review of the orders and opinions of the district court in this matter.”
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Pitts, Opp. No. 91187103 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2016)).
191 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
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therefore federal courts are to give proper deference to its holdings on such
issues.192
The legal action in Houndstooth Mafia began in 2008, and in 2013, the TTAB
issued its holding in favor of Houndstooth Mafia (that there was no likelihood
of confusion between its mark and marks owned by the University of
Alabama).193 The consent judgment was issued in May of 2014, ordering the
TTAB to vacate.194 With the USPTO Director’s motion to intervene dismissed
as untimely, the federal court finally held in February 2016 that the TTAB was
without authority to decline compliance with the court’s order, and thus must
vacate according to the terms of the consent judgment.195 One month later, the
TTAB published its order vacating its judgment, but retaining the right to
appeal.196 Given the fact that the district court published its opinion still
demanding vacatur of a non-erroneous TTAB holding one year after the
precedential decision of B&B Hardware was issued, giving preclusive effect to
such judgments, the USPTO exercised its right to appeal.197
The holding of Houndstooth Mafia represents a major step in the wrong
direction in the post-B&B Hardware legal landscape. This case is the first of its
kind since the Supreme Court’s ruling in 2015, and the USPTO should rely on
its holding in appealing the Northern District of Alabama’s holding ordering
vacatur. B&B Hardware gave preclusive effect to TTAB decisions, specifically
in that case to likelihood of confusion issues in subsequent trademark
infringement action.198 In Houndstooth Mafia, the federal court ordered the
TTAB to vacate its decision regarding likelihood of confusion—explicitly
disregarding any issue preclusion from the TTAB’s holding.199
If Judge Proctor had followed the Supreme Court’s precedent set by B&B
Hardware, he would have found the TTAB’s holding that there was no
likelihood of confusion between the two marks at issue to be binding and
preclusive. Therefore, the Northern District of Alabama would have given
deference to that finding and could not make any subsequent ruling on that
issue, let alone order its vacatur. Giving issue preclusion to the TTAB’s finding
would certainly have favored the defendants in the infringement case at bar, and
thus would reward them for putting up a diligent fight at the TTAB

See Cathcart, supra note 114.
TTAB Relents, supra note 23.
194 Id.
195 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d 1150,
1165 (N.D. Ala. 2016).
196 Gholz & Cappaert, supra note 184.
197 Thomas Vitt, Federal Judge vs. TTAB – Trademark Battle over Bear Bryant’s Houndstooth Hat,
THETMCA.COM: TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT, AND ADVERTISING (Apr. 15, 2016), http://
thetmca.com/federal-judge-vs-ttab-trademark-battle-over-bear-bryants-houndstooth-hat/.
198 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
199 Houndstooth Mafia, 163 F. Supp. 3d 1150.
192
193
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proceedings. This outcome is precisely what the holding in B&B Hardware was
designed to effectuate.
Instead, Judge Proctor effectively ignored the Supreme Court by mandating
the TTAB to vacate its holding on that specific element of infringement—one
year after B&B Hardware was decided. In all actuality, the federal court’s final
holding in Houndstooth Mafia is directly adverse to the Supreme Court’s in B&B
Hardware. Therefore, to protect its newly given authority by the Supreme Court,
and to eliminate any potential precedential effect of the Houndstooth Mafia
decision, the USPTO appealed the order of vacatur—but only to voluntarily
dismiss its appeal to the Eleventh Circuit shortly thereafter.200 In doing so, the
USPTO maintained its position that the court’s order was in error.201 Based on
the foregoing facts and precedent set in B&B Hardware, the USPTO should
have stood by its appeal. Now, without the opportunity for the Eleventh
Circuit to make a determination on the legality of the court’s order, the
relationship between the courts and the USPTO has taken a tragic step
backwards to the pre-B&B Hardware era.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the Supreme Court’s decision in B&B Hardware, holding that federal
courts must give preclusive effect to determinations made by the TTAB,202 the
USPTO erred by dismissing its appeal of the Northern District of Alabama’s
order to vacate their non-erroneous holding. Its dismissal wastes a golden
opportunity to strengthen the agency by giving precedential power to B&B
Hardware.
This Note begins by introducing trademark law in the context of the recent
trend by universities of enforcing proper use of their marks through the legal
system. Ultimately, the Note focuses on the evolving relationship between the
federal courts and the USPTO, specifically in light of the recent decision in
Houndstooth Mafia. This relationship underwent a major change after the
Supreme Court’s decision in B&B Hardware. The trademark system was
originally designed as follows: litigants before the TTAB challenged the
registration of marks, and either simultaneously or subsequently challenged
infringement of those marks in the federal courts.

200 Ira S. Sacks & Rachel B. Rudensky, USPTO Drops 11th Circuit Appeal of ND Alabama Order in
Houndstooth Case, MARKS, WORKS, & SECRETS: AKERMAN INSIGHTS ON THE LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (May 16, 2016), http://www.marksworksands
ecrets.com/2016/05/uspto-drops-11th-circuit-appeal-of-nd-alabama-order-in-houndstooth-case
/.
201 Id.
202 TTAB Relents, supra note 23 (“TTAB rulings can have preclusive effects on infringement
suits . . . .”).
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Before 2015, however, litigants unsatisfied with TTAB decisions could
relitigate the same issues before the federal courts—thus manipulating the
system by challenging holdings on the specific findings of fact.203 Even though
the federal courts may have appellate jurisdiction204 over the TTAB holdings,
issues of appeal are issues of law and not of findings of fact. The B&B
Hardware decision is aimed at making the original design of this hierarchy work
by giving preclusive effect to findings by the TTAB. Therefore, litigants cannot
simply go around the TTAB and hope for better luck in the courts on the same
issues.
Houndstooth Mafia represents the first challenge since B&B Hardware to this
relationship “dynamic.”205 The TTAB made a non-erroneous finding of no
likelihood of confusion. The federal court ordered vacatur of the TTAB’s
holding in order to satisfy the terms of a consent agreement between the
parties. The TTAB, in resisting the court order, was correct—and based on
B&B Hardware, the federal court was in error. This finding of fact by the
TTAB on the element of likelihood of confusion must stand, and the court
must give deference to this finding. It may simply not be dismissed either
because the parties want it to be or because the court believes it has the
authority to order it so.
Although the USPTO initially appealed the order to vacate, it shortly
afterward chose to “quietly” dismiss its appeal and end the years-long
“standoff.”206 But by going through with the appeal of this order, the TTAB
would retain its authority granted by the Supreme Court in B&B Hardware. The
federal court’s order in Houndstooth Mafia seems to give no deference to the
holding of that case. In fact, it represents a step backwards by giving absolutely
no preclusive effect to the TTAB’s findings. The outcome is such that federal
courts could, at will, order vacatur of TTAB findings given the circumstances of
the case at bar. If the vacatur of non-erroneous TTAB determinations is on the
table in court, and appeals to either the parties or the bench, then what real
power do they have? A judge may simply sign an order to eliminate its holdings
based on the fact that it is an agency and not a court. Unfortunately, because
the USPTO chose not to continue with its appeal, it appears that unrestrained
203 For example, in Houndstooth Mafia the TTAB held there was no likelihood of confusion—
which favored the Houndstooth Mafia. The University also brought an infringement action in
the federal court. Likelihood of confusion is likewise an element of infringement. Because the
element had been found by the TTAB to not exist here, the University would lose in the federal
court on the infringement case if preclusion was given to that issue. Therefore, it was beneficial
for the University to settle—but on the condition that the court order the TTAB to dismiss its
holding on the likelihood of confusion element, for precedential purposes. Thus, the University
found a way around the TTAB by manipulating the rules.
204 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1).
205 TTAB Relents, supra note 23.
206 Bill Donahue, USPTO Drops 11th Circ. Appeal Of Alabama TM Ruling, LAW360 (May 2, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/791321/uspto-drops-11th-circ-appeal-of-alabama-tm-ruling.
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judicial authority over the administrative agency will continue unchecked—even
given B&B Hardware.
What do the TTAB’s holdings mean if they carry no binding authority in
court? An appeal by the USPTO here would give weight to the B&B Hardware
holding and empower the agency. Litigants will be incentivized to dedicate
more time and resources to proceedings before the TTAB. Importantly, it
would set a precedent reinforcing the TTAB’s critical place in trademark law.
Sadly, however, the USPTO chose to take a knee rather than to go into
overtime. The USPTO was correct in maintaining its stance on the preclusive
effect of its non-erroneous holdings, but erred in dismissing its appeal—thereby
losing the opportunity to reinforce B&B Hardware and improve the relationship
it has with the federal courts.
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